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1 As a first approximation, I take the phrase ‘the appeal to practice’ as follows,
The appeal to practice: for a great many cases, perhaps all, understanding a concept
F requires grasp of how use of ‘F’ bears on practice.
2 The appeal to practice is common to Wittgenstein’s pragmatism and that of the classical
pragmatists. Grasp of concepts is embedded in activity. Quite what this means is a matter
for debate, but the methodological force of the appeal to practice is, prima facie, different
between the pragmatists and Wittgenstein.
3 Peirce has a maxim:1
Consider  what  effects,  which  might  conceivably  have  practical  bearings,  we
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of those effects
is the whole of our conception of the object.
4 Wittgenstein has, at best, a homely reminder: “For a large class of cases […] though not for
all […] the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”2 The difference seems to be that
for  the  pragmatists  the  appeal  to  practice  is  part  of  a  systematic  reconstruction  of
philosophy. The maxim is a guide for doing philosophy right. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s
appeal to practice is often taken as a deconstruction of the pretensions of thinking that
there is anything left to do in philosophy once we have described the use of words aright.
The pragmatists reconstruct philosophy, for there is philosophical explanation to be had
in showing how grasp of concepts is embedded in practice. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s
appeal to practice is often taken to signal the end of explanatory projects in philosophy –
descriptions alone must take their place.3 When Wittgenstein appeals to practice to stop
the regress of the scepticism about rules, it is not part of a reconstructive program in
philosophical explanation.4 It is part of an admonition to give up philosophical theory; it
is a therapy against philosophical theorizing.
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5 This view is given credence by the apparent refusal on Wittgenstein’s part to provide
detail to the concept of practice. The use of the concept at that critical juncture in the
Investigations has the appearance of a primitive. If that were not so, then there would be
more to be said about how the rule-following regress is stopped; there would be detail to
be  provided about  what  it  means  for  practice  to  provide  the  glue  to  the  normative
patterns of word use.
6 In this paper I want to challenge the idea that ‘practice’ is a primitive for Wittgenstein. I
do this by focusing on one specific element of the appeal to practice – the nature of the
activities involved in skill acquisition, in particular the role of training. Both Dewey and
Wittgenstein privilege the idea of skills and crafts. Techniques for skillful activity are
central to their appeals to practice. There is, however, a dilemma about skill acquisition.
It arises in an especially acute form given Wittgenstein’s restrictive concept of training.
In showing how to respond to the dilemma, I shall suggest that Wittgenstein’s appeal to
practice is more programmatic than therapeutic. Methodologically, his position is closer
to the classical pragmatists than normally acknowledged. The point of this re-appraisal of
Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice is not primarily exegetical or historical; it is substantive.
It is to begin to make the case for an examination of the detail that needs to be added to
the appeal to practice in order to be able to do real philosophical work with the concept. I
shall  suggest  that  Wittgenstein  laid  the  foundations  for  a  programmatic  appeal  to
practice that has real explanatory teeth. The key move in making sense of Wittgenstein’s
account of practice focuses on a concept he shares with Dewey – selective attention.
Wittgenstein deploys it infrequently, but critically. For Dewey it is key to his account of
experience although he gives little sense of the sort of detailed work that I note for it. I
want to isolate the role this concept plays in making sense of the role of training in skill
acquisition.
7 The argument proceeds as follows: in section 2 I outline two key concepts that seem
implicated in Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice – the concept of training and the concept
of second nature; in section 3 I detail the dilemma that Wittgenstein’s use of ‘training’
produces in trying to understand the relationship between training and second nature; in
section 4 I show that the dilemma from section 3 is real and provide a formulation that
applies across a wide range of skills training; in section 5 I provide the general form of the
solution to the dilemma – Wittgenstein’s way out – and illustrate the solution with a
range of examples to show how training gives rise to second nature. The resulting model
provides detail on the concept of practice that, although only hinted at infrequently in
Wittgenstein’s  own  texts,  makes  better  sense  of  his  repeated  use  of  the  concept  of
training as a basis for developing second nature. It also suggests a promise of further
points of contact between Wittgenstein and Dewey on education.
 
2. Training and Second Nature
8 Two concepts seem central to Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice – training and second
nature. Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice involves ways of thinking, acting and being in
the world that are second nature. The concept of second nature picks out capacities that
although needing to be learnt (hence not first nature) are nevertheless aspects of our
natural way of being in the world.5 It is their naturalness that absolves us from providing
a theoretical account of their acquisition, constitution and development. It is this that
suggests that practice is a primitive. That it is second nature for us to go on in one way
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rather than another with the use of a word is a fact about who and what we are. It is not a
matter for further scrutiny, for that would only invite further regress. The capacities that
contribute to second nature and the way we come into our second nature are to be
described, not explained.6
9 If  the  practical  capacities  of  concept  use  are  second nature,  then although they are
excused theoretical scrutiny, they still need to be learnt. Wittgenstein emphasizes the
role of training in this regard. The practice of second nature has its roots in training. It is
here that Wittgenstein’s position is at risk of becoming incoherent. The English word for
training covers a broad range of activities, from simple S-R conditioning to a form of
acculturation into practices for which the German word bildung seems appropriate. Many
commentators assume that Wittgenstein’s talk of training can be assimilated into the
bildung end of that spectrum. 7 If so, then talk of training is no more than an element of
the descriptive enterprise of recording the trajectory of learners as they gain entry into
concepts that in time become second nature. If ‘training’ is understood as akin to bildung,
Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice can only be part of a descriptive methodology. Such a
reading is not, however, sustainable.
10 Wittgenstein’s word for training in German is abrichtung. He always uses this word. In
German, this is a concept of training applicable only to animals, never humans. It is a
concept for quite brutal training regimes; it is applicable for whipping horses, but is out
of place in describing regimes for human learning. The restrictive nature of the concept
in Wittgenstein’s original is lost in the breadth of the concept expressed with the English
word ‘training.’ The restrictiveness of Wittgenstein’s original is better captured with the
concept of conditioning.8 For Wittgenstein, training is at the simple S-R conditioning end
of the range of English senses of the word.
11 Does this matter? Here are two options. Either Wittgenstein’s use of training is, despite
the German original, really talking of forms of instruction akin to bildung or it is S-R
conditioning. If the former, Wittgenstein’s trajectory from training to second nature is
wholly descriptive, both phases are conceived in fundamentally the same way as forms of
activity richly saturated with concepts and understanding. That is coherent, but amounts
to endorsing a view that is prima facie quite implausible: there is no such thing as an
account of learning. The trajectory from training to second nature is not a trajectory that
plots a path of concept acquisition, for ‘training’ only applies to subjects already within
the space of concepts. In addition, the appeal to practice is in danger of being rendered
vacuous for there is no granularity to be added to the claim that concept use is embedded
in practice. The account of practice turns out to be an account of activities saturated with
concepts, so it is hard to see precisely what role activity and practice adds to the account
of concepts. It is this that makes Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice seem wholly negative, a
riposte to the urge for a theoretical regimentation of meaning and the attempt to posit
meanings as entities beyond what is given in the everyday patterns of word use. In place
of philosophical theory we get description. That might involve an extensive ethnology of
practice and learning as we describe the activities, many of which are interestingly social
in character, that comprise meaningful word use. But this only accentuates the move
away from philosophical theory to a more sociological turn of description. And if the
appeal to practice is negative,  it  then seems distinct from that found in the classical
pragmatists.9
12 Alternatively, Wittgenstein’s consistent use of ‘abrichtung’ and its cognates is taken at face
value: training is S-R conditioning. But that is now hardly compatible with a descriptivist
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methodology, for the description leaves a host of challenging and interesting questions
ignored, if not begged. The description would be that some creatures, e.g. humans, when
subject to S-R conditioning regimes with word use gain a second nature grasp of concepts.
But that is a striking fact. With other creatures there is no such route, but nothing is
available in the description to say why this might be so, nor how it might be so.10 Starting
with such an impoverished notion of  training makes  the trajectory from training to
second nature seem an impressive achievement, but it tells us nothing about the nature
of this. Furthermore, most people take Quine’s formulation of naturalism as a reductio of
the idea that that there is a route from S-R conditioning to grasp of concepts.11
13 Prima facie, Wittgenstein’s concept of training fails to make sense of a trajectory from
training to second nature. I think there is a real dilemma here.12 In the next section I set
out the dilemma in some detail before turning to a way of reading Wittgenstein that
moves away from the descriptivism normally attributed to him.
 
3. The Learning Dilemma
14 The dilemma with the trajectory from training to second nature is closely related to
Fodor’s  paradox  of  learning.  I  start  with  a  sketch  of  Fodor’s  paradox.  Consider  the
question,  ‘How  do  we  learn  a  new  concept?’  The  obvious  answer  is  to  appeal  to
experience. So, let ‘F’ be the concept we want to learn from experience. In order to learn
the concept, we need to have experiences in which things that are F are experienced as
being in common. It is not enough simply to experience things that are F, we need to
experience them as a kind. An experience of such things as of a kind can only be such if
the experience represents them as being alike. To have an experience that represents
these things as of a kind is to exploit a capacity to represent them as being the same in
the relevant way. But a representation of these things as being the same in the relevant
way is the concept of things being F. It might not carry that label, but it is that concept. In
other words, you could not have the appropriate experience if you did not already have
the concept.  There  is  then,  no such thing as  learning a  new concept.  There  is  only
learning of labels for concepts that are innate.
15 A bold response to Fodor’s argument would be to avoid the rich account of experience
that Fodor posits by working with an impoverished Quinean account of experience in
terms of patterns of retinal stimulation. But that just sets the dilemma for an account of
learning. The options are now either attempt what many think impossible and give an
account  of  how grasp of  concepts  can be  derived from an impoverished base  set  of
capacities (capacities to differentially respond to stimuli), or endorse a rich account of
the learner with innate concepts. I think the dilemma that Fodor’s argument presents is
real and is worth responding to. I  want to locate the issue about the trajectory from
training to second nature in the same framework.
16 You might think that what is wrong with Fodor’s argument for nativism is that it is too
intellectualist in its view of concepts and representation. It ignores the role that activity
plays alongside experience in acquiring concepts. That is to say, a pragmatist appeal to
practice fares better than experience in accounting for concept acquisition. So consider
the alternative hypothesis that deploys encounters with things that are F in activities
rather than in experience. The thought would be that in order to acquire the concept F
rather than experience things that are F as being relevantly similar, we encounter things
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that are F in our activities. Training in activities with respect to things that are F takes the
place of experiences of things that are F. This is not, however, an improvement.
17 Encounters with things that are F in activities need to be encounters not just with things
that happen to be F but, as we might put it, F-ish encounters. Our active encounters need
to be F-shaped. Another way of putting the point would like this. Suppose the aim is to get
us to act purposely with respect to things that are F, for it is such practices that manifest
grasp of the concept F. But to get us to act purposely to things that are F requires that our
activity has, as it were, an F focus to them. But having an F focus is surely the target
outcome of the training regime, not its input?
18 What this amounts to might be encapsulated somewhat provocatively as follows. The
appeal to practice that sees concept acquisition grounded in activities and training might
be thought to circumvent Fodor’s challenge, but it does not. The target is to acquire a
capacity for doing Y, where doing Y is the activity that manifests the target concept. To
learn this new skill, we are trained. If we cannot yet do Y, for real learning is on the
agenda, then we must start by doing something else. So, when we cannot yet do Y, what is
it  that we do in order to learn to do Y? Very simply,  how can doing something else
(something that is not a doing Y) help us learn how to do Y? And if nothing can, are we
condemned to accept,  with Fodor,  a nativism about capacities for activities alongside
conceptual capacities? If not, what can it mean to say that in order to learn the capacity
for doing Y we practice first the capacity for doing X?
 
4. Learning To Do One Thing By Doing Something Else
19 The problem here is an instance of a more general one: How do we acquire a capacity for
something that we cannot yet do? Or, what do we do in learning how to do something we
cannot do?13 It  is enough to take the problem in the simple form: what do we do in
training that enables us to acquire a capacity that we did not have before? In particular,
why does repetition play such a large role in the acquisition of new capacities? One of the
points of Wittgenstein’s appeal to training is that many skills require repetitive training
in  order  to  be  acquired.  But  if  we  cannot  yet  do  the  thing  in  question,  how  does
repeatedly doing something else help us acquire the capacity to do the target thing? How
does doing a lot of one thing, help us do something else?14
20 To keep matters simple, I concentrate on the following key claim about training:
(1) Repeatedly doing X brings it about that we can do Y.
21 Unless we concede a nativism about all skills, on which repetition is simply the practice in
deployment of skills already present, then (1) must be true for some skills. Intuitively, we
tend to think it true of most skills. Our dilemma concerns how we make sense of (1). If we
can make sense of (1) then two things seem to follow: (a) we have the beginnings of an
account  that  resists  Fodor’s  dilemma;  (b)  we  have  within  our  account  of  practice
resources for an explanation of the trajectory from training to second nature and not just
a description. And if we have an explanation of the trajectory from training to second
nature,  we  have  explanatory  granularity  to  the  appeal  to  practice;  the  appeal  is
programmatic, not therapeutic. I want to suggest that Wittgenstein has the resources for
a programmatic appeal to practice; furthermore, it is an appeal to practice that lays the
foundation for a more extensive investigation of practice than provided by the classical
pragmatists. There are points of contact between the model I draw out of Wittgenstein
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and aspects of Dewey’s philosophy. I shall note these as I proceed, but not in any great
detail.  For the main part, Dewey, like Wittgenstein, left more unsaid than said in the
appeal to practice.
22 Consider training in skills regardless of whether or not concept acquisition is involved. I
think it is often the case that, strictly speaking, we come to learn how to do one thing by
repeatedly doing something else. This is not as odd as it might sound, but even in cases of
acquiring  motor  skills  the  details  at  play  suggest  something  important  about  how
learning works. It illuminates both the concepts of training and of second nature and how
they are related and thereby provides granularity to the appeal to practice.
23 So consider training in a motor skill such as learning how to produce a forehand top-spin
drive in tennis.  You might know in general what is required. You know you need to
produce a sort of upward stroking motion as the racquet strikes the ball, but it is difficult
to get this right and to produce it consistently while also delivering appropriate power
into the drive. Disregard for the moment the role that your conceptual understanding of
what  you  are  doing  plays  and  consider  the  following  common  instruction  given  by
trainers.
24 The tennis coach introduces an activity for you to practice that is not the same as the
activity of producing a top-spin forehand drive. He instructs you in the manner of placing
your leading foot to ensure you stand side-on to the ball when striking it. You consciously
repeat the orientation move and the deliberate and accentuated placing of the lead foot
that anchors your positioning as you lean into the shot. It is this bodily orientation that
you repetitively train. By concentrating on doing this you acquire the ability to perform
consistent top-spin forehand drives. The bodily orientation skill is not simple. It involves
a number of factors, but the one you mostly concentrate on is the placing of the lead foot
and the slight lean into the direction of that foot as you make the stroke. Call this the
platform activity. My suggestion is that repetition of the platform activity, typically so
that it becomes second nature, is what brings it about that you are able to acquire the
target activity – consistent performance of the selected stroke. This example is similar in
form to another familiar learning situation.
25 Novice bike riders find it very difficult to ride with balance. There is a lot to master to
keep a bike upright for a significant period. Rather like the tennis case, it is no good
insisting that the learner persevere with riding properly.  The sensible advice is once
again to stage what the learner has to repeat and focus on in their training. Asking them
to concentrate on balancing is asking too much, for they cannot yet balance.  Just as
asking the tennis novice to concentrate on producing top-spin drive is asking too much.
You ask the novice cyclist to concentrate on something else: you ask them to concentrate
on riding in a fixed direction, eyes firmly fixed on a point ahead. This is something they
can do and by repeatedly practising that ability they acquire the more complex ability to
ride steadily and balanced. Riding focused on the point ahead is the platform activity,
repetition of which brings the target activity, a complex of muscular control over the
whole body, into focus.
26 The general idea is that repetition of a platform activity makes acquisition of the target
activity possible. Before I outline what this claim commits us to, let me clarify a number
of  points  about  it.  In some cases  the platform activity is  a  component  of  the target
activity. When that is the case, it might be thought that this is not really an instance of
learning to do one thing by doing another, for we learn to do Y by compiling the activity
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out of its component activities of which doing X is just one. If the relation between doing
Y and doing X is that the former is compiled out of executions of the latter, plus some
others, then this is not really a case of learning to do one thing by doing something else,
for the target activity is identified with the sum of the platform activities.  Doing the
platform activities just is doing the target activity.
27 Some cases might be like that, but most are not. Consider the tennis example. On first
acquiring the target ability its execution will most likely regularly include the platform
activity of the accentuated placing of the lead foot. There is, however, no reason why that
has to be the case and even when it  is,  it  is  possible as  the target  activity becomes
practiced that you are able to detach it from the platform activity. You learn how to
preserve and enact the appropriate actions independently of the routines repeated in the
platform activity. The scope for this detachment is quite common, even in cases where
the  platform  activities  are  clearly  assemblies  of  actions  that  are  components  to  be
compiled into the learning attempts at the target activity.15
28 If doing X is just a component to be compiled with others to generate doing Y, then the
trajectory from training to second nature could be conceived as merely the rendering of
the component activities second nature so that their integration into the target activity
no  longer  requires  conscious  monitoring.  There  is  some plausibility  to  that  view.  It
applies  to  some  examples.  It  seems  to  provide  a  simple  way  of  understanding  the
trajectory from training to second nature.  But care is  needed even with such simple
examples to pinpoint precisely what is involved in rendering a skill second nature. The
temptation is  to see the trajectory from training to second nature as a trajectory to
silence conscious monitoring. Abilities the execution of which required close conscious
monitoring are practiced until they achieve silent running. But there are different cases
at play.
29 The  simple  case  is  where  a  single  ability  is  practiced  so  that  the  initial  conscious
monitoring required for its execution can be, as it were, turned off. In the tennis example,
this applies to the transition from consciously placing the lead foot in an accentuated way
to  an  ability  that  becomes  natural  and  executed  repeatedly  and  with  ease  without
conscious monitoring. Call this a case of simple silent running. But that is quite different
to the trajectory at play when practicing the elements of posture in order to acquire the
ability to produce a top-spin forehand drive. The various elements might be practiced to
second nature. Whether or not the elements are conceived as elements that are compiled
into the target activity or the target activity is detachable from the compiled elements,
nevertheless  the  transition  to  execution of  the  target  activity  is  not  a  simple  silent
running transition.
30 Consider first the case in which the platform activities are elements that compile to the
target activity, so the latter is identified with the compiling of the former. Even so, it
would be a mistake to assume that all that is going on in such a case is the move to silent
running. Much depends on what we think goes into compiling. If the compiling is simply
a sequencing, then rendering each component of the target into silent running could
amount to rendering the target activity second nature too. On this scenario, there is no
more  to  the  target  activity  other  than  running  the  platform  activities  in  the  right
sequence. There is, therefore, arguably little else for conscious awareness to attend to
once it has ordered the platform activities and rendered them into silent running. The
archery example above (see footnote) might be thought such a case, but even that is
probably not right.
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31 Even if the target activity is compiled by sequencing the platform activities, it is not true
that there is nothing for consciousness to attend to, for consciousness needs to bring it
about that the platform activities are sequenced. You select the platform activities, you
concentrate on performing them in the right order and appropriately spaced. Even in the
simplest case, you work at putting this all together. And the work is plausibly the work of
consciously attending to what you are doing, doing the platform activities in the right
order. It is that conscious sequencing that you eventually silence with repetition. What
we can say with some confidence is that cases in which the target activity is identifiable
with a sequencing of platform activities will be cases in which rendering the latter into
silent running will be to execute the trajectory from repetitive training of doing X to
doing Y second nature. But even in the simple case, the trajectory from doing X to doing
Y is one effected by your consciously attending to the doing X components in the right
sequence so that a doing Y is achieved. It is you, by your conscious attention, who brings
it about that you do Y. I suspect that there are very few cases that are this simple.
32 Consider again the archery case. The target activity – consistent ability to aim accurately
– is detachable from the platform activities out of which it is compiled. Initial executions
of consistent aimings might be simple sequencing of the platform activities, but in most
cases there is a further stage. There is more content to the idea of ‘compiling’ than the
simple case of  consciously performing the activities in the right sequence.  The more
complicated case is, roughly, like this. By repeatedly practicing the platform activities to
the extent that they are executed on silent running you find that new things become
potential foci for conscious awareness. The practicing of keeping the shoulders low is not
just a device to bring it about that you draw the bow with your back muscles rather than
the arm, it brings it about that you can become conscious of what it is like to draw with
your  back  muscle.  Indeed,  as  the  posture  with  regard  to  shoulders  becomes  second
nature, so the ability to be aware of what your back muscles are doing becomes more
pronounced to the extent that rather than being conscious of what your back muscles are
doing, you become able by concentrating on those muscles to enact their performance
regardless of the precise alignment of the shoulders. Your conscious awareness shifts,
from the shoulders to the back muscles. And it is this that, in part, explains why the
ability  to  aim accurately  acquired  by  the  practice  is  detachable  from the  ability  to
perform the platform skills. So although the platform activities are practiced repeatedly
so that their execution becomes second nature, that in itself is not to render the target
activity second nature, indeed it is not identifiable with execution of the target activity.
The target activity is detachable from the performance of the platform activities. That is
why we say in such cases that by repeated practice of the platform activities you acquire a
‘feel’ for what it is to aim accurately. It is because of this ‘feel’ that you know before the
arrow gets to the target if you’ve done it wrong. Similarly, you recognise a good shot
before it reaches the target. The ability to produce a top-spin forehand drive in tennis is
similarly detachable from the platform routines.
33 These are moderately simple examples. It is not difficult to explain what is happening in
them. Given the sort of musculature that humans have, generations of archery and tennis
tutors have come to realize that training one set of muscles to perform in a certain way
brings it about that a further muscle configuration becomes salient to the performer. In
some cases, the scaffolding of awareness for the target muscle set turns on more than the
contingencies  of  the  relations  between  different  muscles  in  the  human  frame;  the
scaffolding can include cultural facts. The scaffolding of the novice bike rider’s awareness
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of what goes into balancing draws on the contingencies of the way that balance control is
effected by head position, but it also draws on a cultural scaffolding – the rider’s parent
typically runs along behind with a surreptitious hand on the rear of the saddle providing
an extra contribution to the overall scaffolding of the target activity. Although simple,
the significance of these examples is, I think, considerable.
34 In general terms, the transition from a training routine that concentrates on repetition of
the platform activity to the acquisition of the target activity is a case of learning to do Y
by doing X. But that is no longer as mysterious as it first sounds. We have some detail on
this transition that not only describes it but explains how it is possible. The form of the
explanation is that skill  acquisition is staged. Repeated practice of platform activities
provides the staging for the target activity. There is a transition from the former to the
latter; there is real learning in skills. This means that what we achieve at the end is, with
respect to the earlier stage, new. It is that fact that makes the idea of learning to do Y by
doing X appear mysterious. But the novelty effected by this transition is explained by
what we might call the bridging activity – the activity of conscious attention.
35 In simple cases, the target activity is compiled by sequencing the platform activities. In
such cases, the role for conscious attention is to sequence the platform activities. In a
great many cases, the target activity is compiled by virtue of the way that repetition of
the platform activities to second nature provides a basis for conscious attention to find
salient the performance of the target activity where that is detachable from the platform
activities. In such cases, genuinely new actions become salient to our awareness. In both
the simple and more complex case,  the role for conscious attention is to extend our
activities:  what  is  available  to  awareness  is  not  restricted  to  what  falls  within  the
practical scope of the activities already at our disposal. It is conscious attention in the
above description that is effecting the transition from repeatedly doing X to doing Y.
 
5. Wittgenstein’s Way Out
36 I  noted  earlier  that  Wittgenstein’s  account  of  learning  is  potentially  incoherent.  His
emphasis on a particularly crude S-R model of training makes it a mystery how new skills
could  be  acquired,  let  alone  how  S-R  training  might  provide  a  basis  for  concept
acquisition.  The  description  above  offers  a  general  response  to  this  challenge  to
Wittgenstein’s account of learning. The description provides a model of learning that is
essentially staged and such that the transition between stages is effected by conscious
attention. The appeal to attention here is an extension of the role that has been suggested
for consciousness in recent work on reference.16 It is a concept that appears infrequently
but  critically  in  Wittgenstein.  It  is  key  to  understanding  the  role  of  ostension  that
Wittgenstein does not critique in the early sections of Philosophical Investigations.17 It is
also closely related to a key concept in Dewey’s account of experience. Dewey has a key
role for the concept of context, ‘the most pervasive fallacy of philosophic thinking’ turns
on ‘neglect of context.’18 But his notion of context has at least two ingredients when we
consider how it bears on his account of experience. The key ingredients are background
and selective interest. The former is that which is taken for granted with respect to the
particular question that is occupying the field of thinking. The latter is the ‘attitude’ that
frames or  shapes  the particular  case:  ‘This  attitude is  no immediate  part  of  what  is
consciously reflected upon, but it determines the selection of this rather than that subject
matter.’19 Like Wittgenstein, Dewey has selective interest operating not as part of what is
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reflected upon (what is already second nature, if not conceptual) but as a prior selection
that frames reflection.
37 The model I have outlined comprises a trio of hypotheses:
(a) skill acquisition is typically staged; acquiring a target skill is undertaken by first
acquiring an earlier stage skill.
(b) acquiring the target skill  is  typically made possible by the earlier stage skill
being rendered second nature.
c) there is a general bridging capacity that provides the incremental enhancement
from a  platform of  second nature  performance  of  the  earlier  stage  skill  to  the
beginnings of rote practice for the target skill.
38 I suggest that the general bridging capacity is the capacity for conscious attention, where
this is understood as a basic capacity of consciousness to focus on things made salient in
the environment and where it  is a form of awareness that is prior to a conceptually
mediated awareness. The salience to which consciousness attends can be generated by
repeated activities of the platform skill. The intuitive idea here is simple. The acquisition
of  the  earlier  stage  skill  as  second  nature  brings  into  salience  items  (objects  and
properties) that attention latches onto as the focus for the first executions of the target
skill.  The  process  iterates,  with  successive  renderings  of  skills  into  second  nature
providing the platform from which conscious attention reaches beyond what has been
rendered skillful to find new items to act upon. The role of conscious attention is, if you
like, to see into the gaps between the execution of skills already mastered and to find the
territory for further activity.  Conscious attention is itself  a form of activity.  It  is the
master activity that drives learning, but it works incrementally. It is scaffolded by the
repetition  of  those  activities  that  are  rendered  second  nature.  With  respect  to  any
particular  ability,  attention  can  always  outreach  what  that  ability  operates  upon.
Attention is the general capacity for taking awareness further. To say that it has this role
is just to note a feature of the concept of attention as I am using it that has been claimed
for it recent debates in the philosophy of mind.
39 My appeal to attention is of a piece with the idea that attention picks out a capacity for
making things and properties salient to oneself in experience in a manner that does not
require a conceptual shape to that salience.20 That makes it a general capacity that can
play a generative role in the development of conceptual modes of making things available
to awareness in experience. Just so in the case of capacities for craft skills. Such skills are
ways of organizing our manipulative engagements with things; attention is the general
and generative capacity that first puts things within reach so that capacities for craft
skills can pick them up. But there is a further point about attention that the craft cases
make explicit.
40 The idea of attention as the master capacity is not the idea of a general capacity whose
reach is fully formed. It would be too easy to claim for the capacity for attention that
there was, at the outset, no limit to its power of discrimination. That would fail to capture
what surely seems true: that what falls within the reach of your capacity for attention is
not open-ended, it is a function of what you have previously attended to and made secure
in  its  availability  either  by  conceptualizing  it  or,  in  the  case  of  manipulative  skills,
rendering it second nature. The fineness of grain of the deliverances of attention is not
independent of the developmental trajectory of skills already in place for the subject.
This is the key point to Dewey’s deployment of selective attention against a background.
Attention  is  not  a  magic  wand  that  brings  anything  we  like  within  awareness.  Its
operation is constrained. What it can bring to awareness, although it outruns what has
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thus  far  been conceptualized and/or  rendered second nature,  is  only  ever  a  modest
extension in range, not an inexhaustible one. Attention is, if you like, a ‘seeing beyond’
what has thus far been rendered second nature (whether in concepts or in manipulative
skills).
41 The above model captures an aspect of the phenomenology of learning that is otherwise
difficult to make sense of. Sometimes, practicing an activity in order to acquire a new
activity can feel almost like a blind practice. You repeatedly practice the placing of the
feet in the tennis example with, at first, little or no sense of what precisely it is you want
to acquire. Or, to take a different example, when learning a new and technically tricky
piece on a musical instrument, you practice the mechanics of striking the right notes
with little sense at first of how you’ll ever manage to acquire the right phrasing and
dynamics to produce the performance that properly emulates the recording you flavor. In
these and other cases, it can seem as if you are almost blindly doing one thing with little
more than a vacant hope that the eventual skill will fall within your reach. That sort of
phenomena strikes me as quite common and true to what it  can be like in trying to
master a range of manipulative skills. The model I have outlined makes sense of this, for
it is only by repeated practice of the platform skill so that it becomes second nature that
attention can begin to pick out the nuances of the target skill – the right dynamics of
phrasing,  the  right  orientation  of  back  muscles  in  making  the  drive,  etc.  What  this
underlines  is  that  although attention outruns or  outreaches what  is  available  in our
manipulative engagements with things found in developed techniques that have become
second nature, the character of attention is best expressed in its almost inquisitive force
of reaching beyond the point you’ve currently achieved. If it wasn’t like this, it would be a
puzzle why, at any given stage of development of craft skills, one wasn’t swamped with
data in experience about all the new things that one might attend to next. But one is
never  swamped  like  that  and  the  reason  is  because  attention  is  fundamentally
incremental in its operation.
42 As it stands, the claim that attention is fundamentally incremental is an hypothesis. 
43 The  role  of  attention  is  delimited  by  a  pair  of  opposing  requirements.  If  what  was
available to awareness did not exceed what was already available within the compass of
those capacities already mastered, then there would be no input to the learning process.
We would be stuck with the puzzle of how, by doing something you can already do, you
thereby learn to do something new. Alternatively, if attention were profligate and able to
pick up just any and everything out with the scope of mastered capacities, then it would
be a puzzle why learning took much time at all and why it seemed to follow well-worn
trajectories  of  development  rather  than  almost  spontaneous  bursts  of  innovation  in
capacities followed by a lifetime of relaxation in the thrall of one’s accomplishments. The
reality  is  somewhere  between  these  two  and  can  only  be  so  if  attention  plays  an




44 It is important to note that attention is not just a psychological mechanism, a mechanism
for selecting perceptual data for processing. In that sense, lots of animals have an ability
for attention, where that amounts to a selection mechanism answerable to the need to
align  the  creature’s  dispositions  with  those  of  the  environment.  A  creature  with  a
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powerful disposition to feed needs to select those parts of the environment that will
satisfy this disposition; for example, keeping track of its prey. In that sense, attention is
the mechanism by which creatures latch onto regularities in nature and by so doing bring
it about that their behavior acquires regularities that match those in the world around
them. So construed, attention is no more than the mechanism by which the regularities
of a creature’s behavior are brought into line with the regularities of the environment. It
is the mechanism by which the creature’s own teleologically conceived capacities align
with the  teleology of  the  world.  Construed in  that  mechanistic  manner,  attention is
important,  but it  provides no further input to the alignment. It  is  the mechanism of
alignment,  not a producer of alignment,  for the production of the alignment of such
capacities might be wholly explainable by the appeal to natural selection. Those creatures
that fail in the alignment exercise do not live long enough to reproduce.
45 In contrast,  the appeal  to attention that I  am making falls  within a different sort  of
explanatory project – the philosophical explanation of how certain things are possible.
We achieve that explanation when we provide a description that reveals how different
elements of our cognitive equipment relate together and by so doing produce distinctive
aspects  of  our  lives  –  in  the  case  at  hand,  learning.  What  makes  the  description
explanatory is the way it highlights key features of our cognitive wherewithal whose role
dominates the phenomenon and is revelatory of important truths about ourselves. The
key element of the description is the ongoing activity of conscious attention that drives
the trajectory from training to second nature by latching onto more things than are
found within the alignment of skills with the teleology of the environment. Conscious
attention is not a mechanism for alignment,  it  is  fundamentally an inquisitiveness,  a
purposeful latching onto things outwith the patterns of stable alignment between activity
and environment. It is the driver for developing new activities and for searching for and
constructing patterns of activity that contribute to our overarching sense-making. With
human subjects, attention is the driver for a sort of restlessness, an inquisitiveness that
gives us the ability to improve and continually enhance our activities. Whether attention
is the resource for this distinctive feature of human cognition or constitutive of this
restlessnes, the way it operates is what makes human learning so distinctive. It is the
reason why practice cannot be a primitive, for practice is rarely simply shared. Once
learnt, our practices rarely simply align, if those initiated into practice are alert to the
opportunities to allow practice to deliver more things for attention to latch onto and
thereby find the motor for the development of practice.
46 In a real sense, the motor for learning and the ongoing development of practices lies in
the equipment that individual  learners bring to bear on their training.  And once we
acknowledge this facet of the concept of attention we can begin to see why Wittgenstein
could place such emphasis on training as abrichtung and still get something like bildung
out of such meager resources. Wittgenstein only gets away with such a trajectory from
bare S-R conditioning to bildung because he implicitly accepts such a rich constitution of
the learning subject. The subject is equipped with the capacity for attention, the master
activity that binds the others into purposeful wholes.21 This makes a significant difference
to the way we conceive of practice.
47 I have concentrated on examples of craft skills and sidelined the role that conceptual
understanding plays in such learning. The cases I have used only make sense for subjects
with considerable intentional sophistication and whose conceptual grasp of what they are
doing bears on the learning in all manner of ways. But the bare stripped down model of
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the staging of skill acquisition in which attention drives the transition from platform
skills to target skill is a model of sophisticated learning subjects independently of where
concepts fit into the picture. It is a model that has the capacity for creative development
written into the acquisition of manual skills. Learning, even in the simplest cases is more
than mimicry. It is more than aligning behavior with others or aligning behavior with the
demands of the environment. Due to the real sense of trajectory from platform to target
skill, the learning found in training regimes is never just S-R conditioning. The learner is
bringing  their  interrogative  and  inquisitional  capacity  for  attention  to  bear  on  the
process. This makes the process more than the mere repetition of platform skills into
second nature. It includes the exploration of the saliences that such second nature makes
available and that bring the target skill into view. And the process iterates. It is no mere
homily then to say that the learner is essentially a subject who ‘joins-in’ the games we
play in our activities. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the idea of games and the idea that
instruction  is  always  an  invitation  to  join  in,  sits  alongside  the  harsh  regimes  of
abrichtung. The training is a scaffolding to the invitation to join-in, it is not the carrot and
stick for aligning behavior, for producing conformity with the group. It is the structure
that helps shape the agency of those who join-in and, having joined in, play their own
role in shaping the ongoing forms of practice.
48 Initiation into practice is  not then,  for Wittgenstein,  a molding into the ways of  the
common. It is an open-ended invitation to join-in and take part in the ongoing sustenance
and development of inherited ways of acting. Put very simply, on this way of reading
Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice, what is distinctive about human subjects as opposed to
most other creatures subject to training, is that humans are learners. It is our equipment
for learning that marks us out not our shared patterns of activity. In other words, we
have culture because of who and what we are; it is not that we are who we are because we
have culture.22
49 The craft skills on which I have concentrated are often classified as forms of know-how. It
is  contentious  to  what  degree  such  know-how  is  independent  of  the  conceptually
structured knowing of know-that. I have ignored that issue.23 But that does not matter,
for whatever you think about know-how, the model  of  learning that I  have outlined
enables us to distinguish between the sort of know-how that could be trained by S-R
conditioning alone and that which demands a contribution from the learning subject
howsoever that contribution is infused with concepts. The following type of know-how
could be trained by S-R conditioning. Suppose a subject is trained to do Y by repetition of
various cases of doing X where these platform actions are compiled into a doing Y and
where ‘compiling’ is a sequencing achieved by S-R conditioning. The right compiling is
achieved by a reward and punishment regime that selects out incorrect sequences. Some
human learning might be like that. Most animal training is, I suspect, like that. But most
human learning is qualitatively different. It might involve know-how rather than know-
that,  but the transition to compile doing X into doing Y is rarely a function only of
external sanctions. That is the Pavlovian model of training, it is pure abrichtung. Much, if
not most, human learning is a function of those sanctions plus a creative trajectory, for
the learning subject is looking for and seeking out patterns onto which it anchors and
about  which it  forms new activities.  The  learner  is  a  pattern-maker,  and not  just  a
pattern-follower.  These  are,  of  course,  the  patterns  that  matter  in  making  sense  of
ourselves. They are the patterns for conceptual grasp of what we do, but the model of
skill  acquisition  I  have  sketched  is  distinctively  human  regardless  of  the  place  that
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concepts have in its operation. What makes it distinctive is the repertoire with which the
learner approaches training: they make their directions as well as following directions.
50 The point is there in Wittgenstein. In Investigations § 208 he discusses learning of new
concepts. He speaks of getting the learner to follow and to continue patterns. He says,
I  do  it,  he  does  it  after  me;  and  I  influence  him  by  expressions  of  agreement,
rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and
so on. (§ 208c)
51 The first sentence might be taken as mere abrichtung, but the idea of letting the pupil go
his own way reveals that the pupil is not merely being conditioned, they start with their
own way of going on. They have a direction and an ability for directing themselves prior
to the sanctions that steer them one way or another. This is why, at the end of this
section, Wittgenstein can say, “Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the
examples given is different from that which ‘points beyond’ them” (§ 208f). The former is
the conditioning of abrichtung; the latter is the teaching applicable to human subjects,
those who can see how examples ‘point beyond.’ The idea that examples ‘point beyond’ is
one of the hardest to accept in Wittgenstein’s discussion of the practice of following rules,
but it is perhaps easier to accept if we also accept the role that attention plays in seeing
beyond the second nature routines of platform activities as we find the purchase for new
target skills.
 
7. Back to Dewey
52 I  have sketched a  way of  developing granularity  to  the appeal  to  practice  that  goes
beyond  anything  Wittgenstein  says.  The  model  makes  the  concept  of  practice
programmatic rather than primitive. It makes the appeal to practice in Wittgenstein not
unlike  its  role  for  the  classical  pragmatists.  But  the  model  goes  further  than  the
pragmatists in filling out detail to the concept of practice at the cognitive rather than
social level. A significant point of contact between Dewey and Wittgenstein has already
been noted as source materials for the appeal to attention in the detail of initiation into
practice. There are other more general points of contact too.
53 Dewey’s emphasis on context, shaped by selective attention, is what gives his account of
inquiry its distinctively problem-solving characteristic. Inquiry has some of the hallmarks
of the craftsman’s concrete resolution of problems rather than the search for timeless
abstract propositions. This, of course, has echoes in Wittgenstein’s own methodology in
which he chisels away at the search for the right formulation that puts words and our
understanding in place without the need for abstract structures. But there is, it seems to
me, scope for a much deeper point of contact.
54 The assimilation of inquiry to the craftsmanship of problem solving has, for Dewey, a
deeply ethical  and political  character  that  informs his  whole  approach to education.
Wittgenstein rarely speaks of such matters, but the cognitive detail of the trajectory from
training to second nature suggests the possibility of a deep basis for some of Dewey’s own
preoccupations. I have argued that in order to avoid the incoherence of appealing to a
brute S-R conditioning model of training, Wittgenstein’s way out works only because it
implicitly ascribes to the learning subject a basic inquisitiveness and interrogation of
context by conscious attention. It is because of this that the learner really is someone who
‘joins-in’ their instruction. They are never passive. They are active participants both in
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executing their trajectory from repetition of platform skills to acquisition of the target
skill and in sustaining the practices of these skills by their going on, their seeing the point
of  the action that  ‘points  beyond’  the example.  It  would be hasty to rush to ethical
conclusions on this basis, but it is tempting to think that it would be difficult to make
proper sense of the deep-seated activity of the learner without giving due consideration
both to the democratizing tendencies of education and training and the democratizing
agenda that enables a proper trajectory from training to second nature. The conditions
for  joining-in  require  not  only  the  appropriate  equipment  from the  learner,  but  an
appropriate recognition of the learner by others if they are to realize their opportunities
for pattern-making. At this point, the matter is no more than suggestive, but the deep
point of contact between Wittgenstein and Dewey on attention or selective interest, when
construed as part of a programmatic appeal to practice, might well lead us to find further
points of contact in the superstructure of ideas that, for Dewey, bound issues of education
to democratic ideals.
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NOTES
1. Peirce C. S., (1992-99: 132). The passage is from Peirce’s essay, “How To Make Our Ideas Clear.”
2. Wittgenstein (1953: § 43).
3. See  Fogelin’s  2009  presentation  of  the  point  of  Wittgenstein’s  well-known  exhortation  to
replace explanation with description in Philosophical Investigations § 109.
4. Wittgenstein (1953: §§ 201-2).
5. See McDowell 1994, especially lectures III and IV for the idea of second nature. See the papers
in Smith 2002, especially the essay by Bubner for critical discussion of McDowell’s appropriation
of the concept of Bildung in explaining the development of second nature.
6. The idea that an explanatory account of our ways of going on would invite further regress is a
common assumption, but one that warrants challenging. See Ginsborg 2011 for a recent account
of normativity that offers explanatory potential while striking a middle way between the familiar
horns of either a dispositionalist reductionism or the nonreductionism of the descriptivist. For
more on this and the general issue of the status of explanation in Wittgenstein see Luntley (in
preparation: Chapter 4).
7. See Stickney 2008 and my reply Luntley 2008.
8. I am indebted to Huemer 2006 on this point.
9. The sociological descriptive turn is in evidence in Dewey. See for example Sennett’s appeal to
Dewey in his detailed sociology of craft skills in Sennet 2008.
10. Williams thinks the difference is the community, cf. Williams 1984, 1999b.
11. Proponents of teleological semantics still carry the flag for Quine, but a natural way of taking
the indeterminacy  of  translation argument  is  as  a  reductio of  reductionist  naturalism about
meaning.
12. Fodor  &  LePore  (2007:  684)  claim  that  Wittgenstein’s  account  of  learning  by  training  is
vacuous. I agree that there is a problem, but disagree on what can be got out of Wittgenstein to
make training a useful concept.
13. See Forman 2008 for a trenchant critique of McDowell’s use of the idea of second nature that
has many points of contact with the concerns of this paper. Forman finds in Aristotle something
very  close  to  the  general  question just  articulated  and even suggests  that  McDowell’s  failed
attempt to deploy Aristotle’s concept of second nature ends up revealing that Aristotle’s use of it
leads us to seeing that this question is a genuine paradox about learning.
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14. The force of this question is akin to that asked of communitarian accounts of rule-following –
why do lots of people with a disposition to give a particular answer to the ‘add 2’ instruction give
content to the idea of correctness when one person with the same disposition does not? 
15. An example that seems more like compiling activity Y out of a set of X activities, rather than
a case of (1), might be this: When learning how to shoot at archery, there are many things you
concentrate on and practice repetitively in learning how to aim. You place your feet deliberately
at the right spacing (no more than shoulders’ width) facing side on to the target, you breath slow
and deep to relax your stance, you turn to face the target in a relaxed and deliberate manner so
as to not disturb the muscle set, you concentrate on keeping your shoulders dropped so that
when you draw the rear shoulder does not rise out of alignment with the lead shoulder, this also
ensures that when you draw you do so with the back muscles and not the arm muscles. In this
case, it seems more plausible to say that these things are not so much the platform for aiming
well, they constitute aiming well. But even here, this is not necessarily so. Nothing rules out your
being able to detach the ability to shoot with a consistent accuracy independently of performing
all the routines first practiced as a novice. Take just one part of this. Ensuring that the shoulders
stay aligned is a device for bringing it about that you draw with the back muscles, not the arm.
But ‘drawing with the back muscles’ is something that the concentration on posture enables you
to feel. You gain an awareness of what it is to draw with the back muscles, an awareness that can
detach from the platform activity of concentrating on posture. The fact that concentration on
posture  can enable  an awareness  of  the  target  activity  of  drawing with the  back muscles  is
important. I return to this below.
16. See Campbell 2002 for this move.
17. See my 2010a for detail on this. The critical occurrence is in Philosophical Investigations § 6
where Wittgenstein allows the teacher to direct the child’s attention when engaged in ostensive
teaching. Wittgenstein differentiates ‘ostensive teaching’ from ostensive definition precisely in
terms that absolve it from critique for presupposing grasp of grammar. So attention works for
Wittgenstein independently of a conceptual or grammatical shaping to experience.
18. From Context and Thought,’ Dewey (1981-2008, Vol 6: 5).
19. Dewey (op. cit.: 14).
20. See Campbell 2002 for the formative articulation of this idea in contemporary philosophy of
mind. For a deployment of the idea in a manner related to the current case, see my 2010b and
also 2009.
21. In a passage not often remarked on, Wittgenstein explicitly cites attention as the motor for
learning, cf. (1953: § 6): ‘An important part of the training will consist in the teacher’s pointing to
the  objects,  directing  the  child’s  attention  to  them…’  Note  also,  that  this  is  not  ostensive
definition. It is a more primitive teaching, but it is one that requires of the pupil that they have
the capacity to attend. Attention is not produced by the teacher’s pointing, attention is directed
by the pointing. The teacher provides a scaffold for the child’s attention. They do not bring it
about that they focus, but help them to sharpen their capacity to focus. The role of pointing here
is more akin to that of the parents’ hand on the rear of the saddle as a device for scaffolding the
rider’s sense of balance, not producing the sense of balance. For more on the role of ‘attention’ in
the opening of the Investigations cf. Luntley 2010a. For a contrasting view see Fogelin (2009: 30ff,
esp. 35).  Fogelin  accepts  that  the  results  of  training  will  be  a  function  of  the  repertoire  of
responses available to the trainee, but explicitly limits these, in the human case, to ‘natural and
instinctive responses.’ Fogelin’s ‘defactoist’ reading of Wittgenstein then amounts to the claim
that human natural responses are a function of the society they inhabit. But that just begs the
question of what it is to be responsive to the developed practices of a culture prior to initiation
into culture. This would seem to be a position, like McDowell’s, in which it is ‘bildung all the way
down.’
22. Contra Williams, see the essays in Williams 1999a.
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23. But see my 2009 for an argument that  most  examples of  human craft  know-how can be
captured with conceptually formed know-that.
ABSTRACTS
Both  Wittgenstein  and  Dewey  have  a  role  for  the  concept  of  skills  and  techniques  in  their
understanding of practices and thereby the possession of concepts. Skills are typically acquired
through training. It can seem, however, that their respective appeals to practice are dissimilar:
Dewey’s appeal is, like Peirce’s, programmatic. It is meant to do philosophical work. In contrast,
for Wittgenstein, the appeal to practice can seem a primitive, something that is meant to put an
end  to  philosophical  work.  I  argue  that  Wittgenstein’s  appeal  to  practice  is  much  closer  to
Dewey’s.  The  argument  arises  out  of  difficulties  with  Wittgenstein’s  concept  of  training.
Wittgenstein’s concept of training is inadequate for bridging the trajectory from initial training
to the acquisition of skills that are second nature. The latter seems required for his appeal to
practice  and  the  way  that  grasp  of  concepts  is  embedded  our  practices  of  going  on.  The
inadequacy  of  Wittgenstein’s  concept  of  training  renders  the  idea  of  such  a  trajectory
incoherent, for it manifests a real dilemma about how to understand the transition from rote
repetitive training to mastery of skillful activity. I show how we can make sense of the role that
training plays in developing skillful activity and how by repetitive training we acquire new skills.
The solution to the dilemma comes from acknowledging a point that Wittgenstein shares with
Dewey concerning the role of selective attention. By acknowledging the role that attention plays
in extending the operation of  skills,  we can make sense of  the acquisition of  new skills  and
provide a granularity to the concept of practice that makes Wittgenstein’s appeal to practice
more  akin  to  Dewey’s:  a  programmatic  concept  rather  than  a  primitive.  Practice is,  for
Wittgenstein,  something to be studied and described in a detail  that does explanatory work.
Furthermore, the account has a number of points of contact with Dewey.
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